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1.  Introduction 
  The theory of purchasing power parity (PPP) is notably silent on issues regarding the 
adjustment mechanism of its convergence process.  The large, volatile PPP deviations observed 
after the advent of the modern float have bred the development of sticky-price models, which 
stress the role of slowly adjusting prices in determining the reversion rate.  In his survey of the 
PPP literature, Rogoff (1996) points out that the observed persistence of real exchange rates is far 
too high to be explained by existing models of PPP deviations.  Although growing evidence in 
support of PPP reversion has been documented (Frankel and Rose, 1996; Oh, 1996; Wu, 1996; 
Papell, 1997; Cheung and Lai, 1998, 2000a; Taylor and Sarno, 1998; Engel, 1999, gives an 
exception), consensus estimates of the reversion speed are remarkably slow with half-lives 
ranging from 3 to 5 years.
1 These half-lives seem too long to be explained by stick-price models, 
which suggest faster reversion with half-lives of 1 to 2 years. 
A recent study by Engel and Morley (2001) sheds new light on the issue in PPP 
convergence.  These researchers observe that the root of the PPP puzzle may lie in the possibly 
different speeds of convergence for nominal exchange rates and prices.  In contrast to standard 
rational-expectations sticky-price models, which impose the same reversion speed for nominal 
exchange rates and prices, they examine an empirical model that allows those variables to adjust 
at different speeds.  Formulating the adjustment equations as a state-space model (Morley et al., 
2002), Engel and Morley evaluate the speeds at which nominal exchange rates and prices 
converge to their respective equilibrium levels that are unobserved.  Empirical results from state-
space model estimation indicate that while prices converge relatively fast, nominal exchange 
rates converge slowly.  The differing-speed finding is intriguing.  It suggests that the torpid rate 
of PPP reversion may come largely from slow nominal exchange rate adjustment rather than from 
slow price adjustment.  If it is true, the finding challenges conventional beliefs in the price-
stickiness explanation and raises new issues in theoretical modeling of PPP disequilibrium 
dynamics.
2 
This study presents additional evidence on the convergence speeds of nominal exchange 
rates and prices.  Using vector error correction (VEC) analysis, we estimate the speeds at which 
the individual variables revert to their long-run values.  The VEC analysis provides an 
alternative, easier way to measure those convergence speeds than the state-space analysis does.  - 2 - 
The latter entails elaborate estimation of unobservable components.  While taking a different 
empirical approach, our results corroborate those of Engel and Morley (2001) that nominal 
exchange rates do converge at a much slower rate than prices.  Half-lives of nominal exchange 
rates are estimated to be from 3 to 6 years, whereas half-lives of prices are found to be 
substantially shorter – mostly about 1 to 2 years.  This study also shows that about 60-90% of 
PPP disequilibrium adjustment takes place through nominal exchange rate adjustment.  Hence, it 
is mostly nominal exchange rate adjustment – not price adjustment – that drives real exchange 
rates toward parity.  As such, the observed rate of PPP reversion reflects primarily the speed of 
nominal exchange rate convergence.  Should nominal exchange rates converge much more slowly 
than prices, the PPP reversion speed can be slower than the price convergence speed, as described 
by the PPP puzzle. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 outlines the VEC model and presents some 
preliminary results.  Section 3 evaluates the relative proportion of PPP adjustment attributable to 
nominal exchange rate and price adjustments.  Section 4 analyzes relative convergence speeds.  
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Basic empirical framework and preliminary results 
Half-life estimates reported in the PPP literature have typically been obtained from 
univariate time-series analysis of the real exchange rate (denoted by q): 
B(L)qt = εt  t = 1, 2, …    (1) 
where L is the lag operator such that Lqt = qt−1, B(L) = 1 ! b1L ! ... ! bkL
k, and εt is the 
random error.  The real exchange rate, which captures the deviation from PPP, is measured by 
 qt = et ! pt       (2) 
where all variables are expressed in logarithms; e is the nominal exchange rate (the domestic 
price of foreign currency); and p is the relative ratio between the domestic price level (p
d) and the 
foreign price level (p
f).  In studying a trivariate system of e, p
d, and p
f, Engel and Morley (2001) 
report that p
d and p
f share similar convergence speeds, and so the theoretical symmetric condition 
holds.  With the symmetric condition imposed, we consider a bivariate model of e and p for 
simplicity.
3  According to the Granger Representation Theorem (Engel and Granger, 1987), a 
cointegrated time-series system has an equivalent VEC representation.  Let Xt = [et   pt]N and β = - 3 - 
[1   !1]N.  The long-run PPP restriction on Xt is that βNXt  = et ! pt is stationary.  The VEC model 
is in general given by 
   ∆Xt = µ ! ΠXt!1 + Γ1∆Xt!1 + ... + Γk!1∆Xt!k+1 + ut      (3) 
where ∆ = 1 − L, Π can be written as Π = αβN, and ut = [u1t   u2t]N is a vector of white-noise 
innovations with E(ututN) = Ω.  Specifically, the VEC model with the PPP restriction has the 
following structure: 
∆et = µ1 − α1zt!1 +∑∑
==





m t m i t i p e
22
1 1 1 1 δ τ + u1t   (4a) 
∆pt = µ2 + α2zt!1 +∑∑
==





m t m i t i p e
22
1 2 1 2 δ τ + u2t    (4b) 
where zt!1 = βNXt!1 = qt!1 represents the error correction term with coefficients, 1 > α1 > 0 and 1 > 
α2 > 0. We first verify the long-run PPP relation.  Monthly data on consumer price indices and 
exchange rates for 5 countries – Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Japan – vis-à-vis the US are 
examined.  Taken from the International Monetary Fund’s IFS data CD-ROM, the data cover the 
period from April 1973 through December 1998.  Panel A of Table 1 contains the results of 
Johansen’s (1991) tests for cointegration.  The results in all but one case support that e and p are 
cointegrated.  The cointegration vector β cannot be uniquely identified under the VEC setting, 
however.  Edison et al. (1997) find PPP restriction tests on β to have very poor size properties.  
As recommended by Froot and Rogoff (1995), the most direct way to verify the long-run PPP 
specification is to perform unit-root tests on the real exchange rate q.  If q is stationary, e and p 
are cointegrated and have a VEC representation with β = [1   −1]N.  Elliott et al. (1996) devise the 
DF-GLS test, which is more efficient than usual unit-root tests.  As reported in panel B, the unit-
root null can be rejected in four of the five cases.  In only one case (the case of Japan) do we fail 
to find stationarity.  Because univariate unit-root tests may lack power, we also apply Taylor and 
Sarno’s (1998) multivariate unit-root test, labeled as the JLR test, in which the null hypothesis is 
that at least one of the series in the panel is nonstationary.  As shown in panel C, the null can be 
rejected at the 10% level, supporting that all the real exchange rate series under study are 
stationary.  Accordingly, our analysis will proceed with the empirical model that the long-run 
PPP condition holds.    - 4 -
Table 1.  Results from cointegration and unit-root tests for stationarity 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R.H.S.       Britain/US         France/US        Germany/US          Italy/US          Japan/US   
variable Lag  Statistic Lag  Statistic Lag Statistic  Lag Statistic Lag  Statistic 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
A. Cointegration test on et and pt (Johansen, 1991) 
 
!2lnQr 2  26.736
** 4  39.052
** 2  19.959
** 2  31.548
** 6  12.250   
 
!2lnQr|r+1 2  21.388
** 4  34.716
** 2  15.966
** 2  26.621
** 6  12.406 
 
 
B. Univariate unit-root test on qt (Elliott et al., 1996) 
 
DF-GLS 4  !1.750
* 4  !2.280
** 2  !2.039
** 2  !2.207
** 4  −0.687 
 
 
C. Multivariate unit-root test on qt (Taylor and Sarno, 1998) 
 
  All five series in a panel 
 




Notes:  The !2lnQr test gives Johansen’s (1991) trace statistic, and the !2lnQr|r+1 test gives Johansen’s (1991) maximal-eigenvalue statistic.  The null hypothesis 
for these two tests here is that the data processes under consideration are not cointegrated.  Critical values for both trace and maximum-eigenvalue statistics are 
given by Johansen and Juselius (1990) and Cheung and Lai (1993).  The null hypothesis for the DF-GLS test is that the data process under examination contains a 
unit root.  Critical values for the DF-GLS test are given by Elliott et al. (1996).  The Taylor-Sarno (1998) JLR test statistic follows a known limiting χ
2(1) 
distribution under the null hypothesis that at least one of the series in the panel contains a unit root.  Rejecting this null will indicate that all the series under 
examination are stationary.  Statistical significance is indicated by a single asterisk ( 
* ) for the 10% level and a double asterisk ( 
** ) for the 5% level.- 5 - 
 
  Before examining the decomposed dynamics in terms of nominal exchange rate and price 
adjustments, it is useful to measure the half-life of PPP deviations under the VEC model.  
Following Pesaran and Shin (1996), the impulse response function of qt (denoted by ψqc) with 
respect to a unit composite innovation βNut can be obtained from the VEC model as follows: 
ψqc(t) = {
1 ) )( (
− Ω ′ ′ Ω ′ β β β β t t C C }
1/2   (5) 
where Ct is defined by a recursive equation: 
Ct = A1Ct!1 + A2Ct!2 + ... + AkCt!k,     t = 1, 2, ...    (6) 
with C0 = I and Ct = 0 for t < 0.  The matrices {Ct, t = 1, 2, ...} constitute the coefficient matrices 
of the moving-average representation of Xt.  Table 2 gives the VEC model estimates, with the lag 
specifications selected using the usual Akaike information criterion.
4  Based on ψqc, we compute 
the first 120 impulse responses, which correspond to a time span of 10 years for monthly data 
(see figure 1).  The half-life of PPP deviations is estimated to be 2.81 years for the British pound, 
3.02 years for the French franc, 3.43 years for the German mark, 3.26 years for the Italian lira, 
and 5.19 years for the Japanese yen.  These half-life estimates are in line with the typical 
estimates of 3 to 5 years reported in the PPP literature. 
 
3.  Relative contributions of nominal exchange rate and price adjustments 
  We next decompose the real exchange rate dynamics and analyze the paths of nominal 
exchange rate and price adjustments separately.  The generalized impulse response approach 
recommended by Pesaran and Shin (1998) is applied.  Unlike traditional impulse response 
analysis (e.g., Lütkepohl and Reimers, 1992), which considers orthogonalized shocks based on 
the Cholesky decomposition, the new approach desirably yields unique impulse response 
functions (IRFs) that are invariant to the ordering of variables.  The generalized IRF for Xt = [et   
pt]N with respect to a unit innovation to the jth variable (j = 1 for a nominal exchange rate 
innovation and 2 for a price innovation) is given by
5 
ψXj (t) = CtΩγj /σjj,  t = 0, 1, 2, ...  (7) 
where Ct is computed from (6) recursively, γj is a selection vector with unity as its jth element and 
zeros elsewhere, and σjj is the jth diagonal element of Ω.  ψXj (t) gives the separate IRFs for - 6 - 
Table 2.  Estimation of the VEC model of nominal exchange rate and price dynamics 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R.H.S.          Britain/US            France/US        Germany/US              Italy/US            Japan/US   
variable  ∆et  ∆pt  ∆et  ∆pt  ∆et  ∆pt  ∆et  ∆pt  ∆et  ∆pt 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 








** (0.038)  (0.009)
** 
  









** (0.007)  (0.002)
* 
 




** (0.007)  (0.057)





∆et!2  !0.122  !0.012  !0.083 0.008  !0.055  !0.007  !0.078  !0.011  −0.104 0.009 
 (0.058)
**  (0.015)  (0.059) (0.007)  (0.057) (0.007)  (0.058)
* (0.010)  (0.629)
* (0.014) 
 
∆et!3    0.157  !0.004       0.091  −0.023 
     (0.059)
**  (0.007)       (0.064)
* (0.014) 
      
∆et!4   !0.025  0.011       0.005  0.014 
     (0.057)  (0.007)
*       (0.064)  (0.015) 
 
∆et!5            −0.005  −0.010 
             (0.064)  ((0.015) 
 
∆et!6            −0.078  −0.003 
             (0.061)  (0.014) 
 
∆pt!1  !0.026 0.273  !0.112 0.249  0.671 0.301  0.851 0.484  0.196 0.152 
 (0.219)  (0.058)
** (0.462)  (0.057)
** (0.434)  (0.057)
** (0.333)
** (0.057)
** (0.254)  (0.057)
** 
 
∆pt!2 0.391  !0.001 0.969  0.029  0.035 0.112  0.096 0.072  −0.104  −0.172 
 (0.217)
* (0.057)  (0.463)
** (0.057)  (0.435)  (0.057)
*  (0.334) (0.058)  (0.248) (0.056)
** 
 
 - 7 - 
Table 2 (Continued) 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
R.H.S.          Britain/US            France/US        Germany/US              Italy/US            Japan/US   
variable  ∆et  ∆pt  ∆et  ∆pt  ∆et  ∆pt  ∆et  ∆pt  ∆et  ∆pt 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
∆pt!3     0.260  0.216       0.164  0.079 
     (0.466)  (0.057)
**       (0.249)  (0.056) 
      
∆pt!4     0.986  -0.009      −0.357 0.019 
     (0.466)
**  (0.057)       (0.249)  (0.056) 
 
∆pt!5              0.200  0.126 
             (0.247)  (0.056)
** 
 
∆pt!6             −0.068 0.190 
             (0.245)  (0.056)
** 
 




LB(5)  4.037 2.384  1.244 1.589  1.893 6.442  1.328 1.461  0.065 0.970 
[p-value]  [0.544] [0.794]  [0.941] [0.903]  [0.864] [0.266]  [0.932] [0.918]  [1.000] [0.965] 
 
LB(10)  5.682 12.289  3.667 17.884  8.105  16.222 4.227  8.992 4.988  6.678 
[p-value]  [0.841] [0.266]  [0.961] [0.057]  [0.619] [0.103]  [0.937] [0.533]  [0.892] [0.755] 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  The numbers in parentheses report the standard errors for the corresponding model coefficient estimates.   Statistical significance is indicated by a single 
asterisk ( 
* ) for the 10% level and a double asterisk ( 
** ) for the 5% level.  σu is the standard deviation of the corresponding innovation term.  The model 
specification was chosen using a standard data-dependent lag selection method based on the Akaike information criterion.  ALB(5)@ and ALB(10)@ present the usual 




Figure 1.  Dynamic responses of real exchange rates to a composite innovation to PPP - 9 - 
nominal exchange rate and price adjustments (denoted by ψej (t) and ψpj (t), respectively).  The 
generalized IRF for real exchange rate adjustment in response to a unit innovation to the jth  
variable is given by 
ψqj (t) =  βNCtΩγj /σjj,  t = 0, 1, 2, ...            (8) 
  A shock to PPP can come about as an exchange rate innovation or a price innovation.  An 
increase in q, for example, can be induced by either a negative innovation to p or a positive 
innovation to e.  In fact, the IRFs of q, e, and p are linked to one another as follows: 
  ψqj (t) = ψej (t) ! ψpj (t),  j  =  1,  2.     (9) 
To quantify the contributions of nominal exchange rate and price adjustments, ∆ψqj (t) is broken 
into two components: ∆ψej (t) and ∆ψpj (t) for j = 1, 2.  Letting gej = ∆ψej (t)/∆ψqj (t) and gpj = 
!∆ψpj (t)/∆ψqj (t), we have gej + gpj = 1, where gej gives the proportion of real exchange rate 
adjustment explained by nominal exchange rate adjustment, and gpj measures the proportion 
explained by price adjustment. 
Table 3 reports the decomposition estimates, along with their standard errors, for different 
time horizons subsequent to a shock.  Given that gej + gpj = 1, the ge1 and gp1 estimates are of 
equal standard errors and so are the ge2 and gp2 estimates.  We observe that standard errors of 
estimates for short horizons of 12 months or less can sometimes be very large, suggesting a high 
level of uncertainty in estimating short-run adjustment dynamics.  At longer horizons, 
nonetheless, the differences between gej and gpj estimates are statistically significant.   
Specifically, the gej estimates are generally much larger than the gpj estimates, supporting that 
PPP deviations are corrected mainly through nominal exchange rate adjustment, albeit price 
adjustment also partly contributes to restoring parity.  In relative magnitude, approximately 60-
90% of the PPP reversion dynamics occur through nominal exchange rate adjustment.  The 
results are independent of whether the shock operates as a nominal exchange rate or price 
innovation.
6 
The IRFs with respect to a price innovation are exhibited in figure 2.  In every case, the 
shape of the IRF for q largely reflects that of the IRF for e, confirming that the nominal exchange 
rate is the prime engine for PPP reversion.  Furthermore, if price innovations were dominating, 
we would expect the IRF for q under price innovations to be very similar to the IRF for q under 
composite innovations (i.e., the IRF for q under both price and exchange rate innovations 
together).  Evidently, little similar dynamics can be observed between ψq2 and ψqc.  Indeed, ψq2 - 10 - 
Table 3. Relative contributions of nominal exchange rate and price adjustments to PPP reversion 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Under an exchange rate innovation        Under a price innovation    
   t  ge1  gp1 SE1     t  ge2  gp2 SE2 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Britain/US    6  0.76 0.24 0.15    6  0.74 0.26 4.55 
    12  0.76 0.24 0.13    12  0.76 0.24 0.14 
    24  0.76 0.24 0.13    24  0.76 0.24 0.13 
    36  0.76 0.24 0.13    36  0.76 0.24 0.13 
    48  0.76 0.24 0.13    48  0.76 0.24 0.13 
    60  0.76 0.24 0.13    60  0.76 0.24 0.13 
    120  0.76 0.24 0.13    120  0.76 0.24 0.13 
 
France/US    6 0.60  0.40  56.62   6 1.17  −0.17 2.64 
    12  0.87 0.13 0.08    12  0.99 0.01  46.67 
    24  0.91 0.09 0.05    24  0.90 0.10 0.11 
    36  0.92 0.08 0.05    36  0.92 0.08 0.05 
    48  0.92 0.08 0.05    48  0.92 0.08 0.05 
    60  0.92 0.08 0.05    60  0.92 0.08 0.05 
    120  0.92 0.08 0.05    120  0.92 0.08 0.05 
 
Germany/US    6  0.85 0.15 0.10    6  1.34  −0.34 26.50 
    12  0.85 0.15 0.11    12  0.87 0.13 1.41 
    24  0.85 0.15 0.11    24  0.85 0.15 0.11 
    36  0.85 0.15 0.11    36  0.85 0.15 0.11 
    48  0.85 0.15    0.11    48  0.85 0.15 0.11 
    60  0.85 0.15 0.11    60  0.85 0.15 0.11 
    120  0.85 0.15      0.11    120  0.85 0.15 0.11 
 
Italy/US    6  0.62 0.38 0.07    6  2.00  -1.00  24.46 
    12  0.60 0.40 0.03    12  0.58 0.42 6.44 
    24  0.59 0.41 0.03    24  0.59 0.41 0.17 
    36  0.59 0.41 0.03    36  0.59 0.41 0.03 
    48  0.59 0.41 0.03    48  0.59 0.41 0.03 
    60  0.59 0.41 0.03    60  0.59 0.41 0.03 
    120  0.59 0.41 0.03    120  0.59 0.41 0.03 
 
Japan/US    6 0.87  0.13  17.85   6 1.88  −0.88 14.54 
    12 0.51  0.49  24.45   12 0.79  0.21  64.79 
    24  0.68 0.32 0.04    24  0.70 0.30 0.31 
    36  0.68 0.32 0.04    36  0.69 0.31 0.09 
    48  0.68 0.32 0.04    48  0.68 0.32 0.06 
    60  0.68 0.32 0.04    60  0.68 0.32 0.06 
    120  0.68 0.32 0.04    120  0.68 0.32 0.04 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes:  The time horizon t is measured in months.  The columns “ge1” and “ge2” indicate the proportion of real 
exchange rate adjustment explained by nominal exchange rate adjustment.  The columns “gp1” and “gp2” indicate the 
proportion explained by price adjustment.  The column “SE1” provides the standard errors for both ge1 and gp1 
estimates.  The column “SE2” gives the standard errors for both ge2 and gp2 estimates.  These standard errors are 
computed in simulation using the technique of resampling with replacement (based on 10,000 iterations), with the 
distributions of the innovation terms in the VEC model being approximated by the empirical distributions of the 
estimated residuals. - 11 - 
 
Figure 2.  Dynamic responses of real and nominal exchange rates and of prices to a price innovation- 12 - 
 
 
Figure 3.  Dynamic responses of real and nominal exchange rates and of prices to an exchange rate innovation - 13 - 
differs dramatically from ψqc in most cases, indicating that price innovations are a relatively 
unimportant source of disturbances buffeting real exchange rates. 
  The IRFs of q, e, and p in response to a nominal exchange rate innovation are displayed in 
figure 3.  In all the cases the hump-shaped adjustment patterns are very much alike.  Again, the 
shape of the IRF for q mostly reflects that of the IRF for e, supporting that the PPP reversion is 
governed primarily by nominal exchange rate adjustment.  Moreover, the predominance of 
nominal exchange rate innovations can be verified by comparing ψq1 (the IRF for q following an 
exchange rate innovation) with ψqc (the IRF for q following a composite innovation).   
Consistently, ψq2 matches ψqc very closely, indicating that nominal exchange rate disturbances are 
the dominant source of real exchange rate fluctuations.
7  Further evidence in support of the 
relative importance of nominal exchange rate innovations comes from half-life calculation.  Half-
lives of real exchange rates under nominal exchange rate innovations are estimated to be 2.80 
years for the British pound, 2.75 years for the French franc, 3.46 years for the German mark, 3.19 
years for the Italian lira, and 5.08 years for Japanese yen.  These estimates are almost the same as 
those half-life estimates computed earlier under composite innovations. 
 
4.  Relative convergence speeds of nominal exchange rates and prices 
With the nominal exchange rate being the main propeller of PPP reversion, the observed 
rate of PPP reversion should reflect much more the speed of nominal exchange rate adjustment 
than the speed of price adjustment.  The convergence of the real exchange rate can therefore be 
sluggish if the nominal exchange rate converges slowly.  Empirical speed estimates will show 
this is indeed the case. 
Given the predominance of nominal exchange rate innovations in real exchange rate 





*)   =   0         ( 1 0 )  
at time t = t
*.  By examining the adjustment paths of individual variables (i.e., ψq1(t) ÷ 0, ψe1(t) ÷ 
ψe1(t
*), and ψp1(t) ÷ ψp1(t
*)) subsequent to an innovation at time t = 0, we can measure how fast 
these variables adjust and converge to their respective long-run equilibrium values.  Analytically, 
the convergence takes place asymptotically (i.e., as t
* ÷ 4) and - 14 - 
  ψe1(tτ) > ψe1(t
*) = ψp1(t
*) > ψp1(tτ) for tτ < 4.      (11) 
In finite-sample estimation, ψe1(t
*) and ψp1(t
*) can be estimated based on a sufficiently large tτ.  In 
our case ψe1(t
*) and ψp1(t
*) will be estimated as follows: 
ψe1(t
*) = ψp1(t
*) = { ψe1(tτ) + ψp1(tτ)  }/2      (12) 
where tτ = 240 months and *ψe1(t) ! ψp1(t)* is very close to zero as t ÷ tτ.  
Half-life estimates of the convergence of p, e, and q are presented in Table 4.  These 
convergence speed estimates confirm that real exchange rates converge substantially slower than 
prices – the half-life of real exchange rate convergence (HLq) is about 1.5 to 2.5 times longer than 
the half-life of price convergence (HLp).  Rogoff (1996, pp.654) discusses the PPP puzzle as 
follows: 
“The failure of short-run PPP can be attributed in part to stickiness in nominal prices; as 
financial and monetary shocks buffet the nominal exchange rate, the real exchange rate also 
changes in the short run.  This is the essence of Dornbusch=s (1976) overshooting model of 
nominal and real exchange rate volatility.  If this were the entire story, however, one would 
expect substantial convergence to PPP over one to two years, as wages and prices adjust to 
shock.” 
Our speed estimates, indeed, show that prices converge at a reasonably fast rate with half-lives of 
about 2 years or less.  The only exception is the case of Japan, for which the half-life of price 
convergence is roughly 3 years but for which the half-life of real exchange rate convergence 
takes even longer – in excess of 5 years.  All the convergence speed estimates thus support that 
the slow convergence of real exchange rates does not stem from slowly converging prices.  
Instead, the slow PPP convergence comes from slowly converging nominal exchange rates.  Half-
lives of nominal exchange rate convergence (HLe) – which range from 3 to 6 years – are 
consistently longer (about 1.5 to 3 times longer) than those of price convergence.
8  Standard 
errors of HLe − HLp estimates are computed using the simulation method, and the observed half-
life differences are significantly greater than zero (i.e., HLe − HLp > 0) at the 5% level in most 
cases and at the 10% level in all cases. 
    Our results here corroborate and reinforce those reported by Engel and Morley (2001), 
who also uncover surprisingly slow convergence for nominal exchange rates. Since the Engel-
Morley study and our study have used different empirical approaches to estimate the - 15 - 
Table 4. Half-lives of convergence of nominal exchange rates, prices, and real exchange rates 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     Britain/US  France/US  Germany/US  Italy/US  Japan/US 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Real exchange rate convergence:     
HLq [Half-life in years]     2.80  2.75  3.38  3.19  5.08 
 
Nominal exchange rate convergence: 
HLe  [Half-life  in  years]    3.21 3.03 3.62 4.40 6.27 
 
Price convergence:     
HLp  [Half-life  in  years]    1.79 1.00 2.32 2.02 3.19 
 
Difference in convergence speed: 
  HLe − HLp  >  0    1.42 2.03 1.30 2.38 3.08 
  (Standard error of HLe − HLp)  (1.01) (0.72) (0.77) (0.98) (1.57) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     
Notes:  Standard errors for the difference in half-life estimates, HLe − HLp, are computed in simulation using the technique of resampling with replacement 
(based on 10,000 iterations), with the distributions of the innovation terms in the VEC model being approximated by the empirical distributions of the 
estimated residuals. - 16 - 
disequilibrium adjustment dynamics, it is instructive to identify the key differences between the 
two approaches.  For the discussion purpose, the basic structure of the Engel-Morley model (with 
the symmetric condition imposed) can be captured as follows: 
et ! Et!1[ t e ] = φ1(et!1 ! 1 − t e ) + ω1t, 0 < φ1 < 1  (13a) 
pt ! Et!1[ t p ] = φ2(pt!1 ! 1 − t p ) + ω2t, 0 < φ2 < 1  (13b) 
where the overbars indicate the unobserved equilibrium values of the corresponding variables and 
ω1t and ω2t are random errors.  The PPP condition, t e = t p , gives a cross-equation restriction.  In 
specifying the equilibrium processes, the first differences of t e and t p are considered to follow 
autoregressive processes.  With some additional structural restrictions imposed, the entire system 
can be written as a state-space unobservable components model and estimated using the Kalman 
filter method. 
  The Engel-Morley state-space analysis and our VEC analysis have different notions of 
convergence.  In the Engle-Morley model, nominal exchange rates and prices are considered as 
converging toward their moving equilibrium levels, t e and t p , respectively.  While nominal 
exchange rates adjust to correct the gap between et and t e , prices adjust to correct the gap between 
pt and t p .  Accordingly, the disequilibrium is gauged by both et − t e and pt − t p at time t.  In our 
VEC model, on the other hand, et and pt are both modeled as converging toward their long-run 
(stationary) equilibrium value,e = p .  The disequilibrium is then represented by both et !e and pt 
− p at time t.  Empirical estimates of convergence speeds from the Engel-Morley study and our 
study should thus be interpreted with the different notions of convergence in mind. 
  The difference in convergence modeling has implications for model estimation.  For the 
Engel-Morley model, the moving equilibrium values, t e and t p , are unobserved stochastic 
variables.  As Charles Engel has observed, estimating the Engel-Morley model is not 
straightforward, and statistical results are conditional on the proper identification and estimation 
of the unobserved variables.  The relative simplicity of the VEC model, by contrast, enables 
straightforward estimation of convergence speeds.  The VEC model is derived from a general, 
direct decomposition of real exchange rate dynamics based on the Granger Representation 
Theorem for cointegrated time-series systems.  It does not impose any specific structural 
restrictions other than the long-run PPP condition.  The VEC model also requires no - 17 - 
identification and estimation of any unobserved stochastic components.  The total deviation from 
long-run PPP is measured by et !e + pt − p = et ! pt, which can be directly observed. 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
  This study has investigated the mechanism by which PPP deviations are corrected.  Using 
an empirical approach different from Engel and Morley (2001), our VEC analysis produces 
further evidence for the difference in convergence speed between nominal exchange rates and 
prices.  The VEC approach provides a convergence speed measure that requires easier estimation 
– and is probably less model-specific – compared to Engel and Morley’s state-space approach.  
Although there are significant differences between the two approaches, our results corroborate 
and reinforce Engel and Morley’s surprising finding:  It is nominal exchange rates, not prices, 
that converge slowly toward PPP.  The robustness of the finding calls into question the basic 
tenet of traditional models of PPP deviations, which emphasize price stickiness as the key 
determinant of the convergence speed.  If the sluggish-price-adjustment explanation is 
empirically significant, we should not find prices to converge faster than both nominal and real 
exchange rates.  Accordingly, the PPP puzzle should be rethought to recognize a pivotal role 
nominal exchange rate adjustment plays in determining the PPP reversion rate. 
  The results from this study – and also the Engel-Morley study – make an interesting 
contrast with those presented by Cecchetti et al. (2002).  Cecchetti et al. find PPP convergence 
between cities within the U.S. to be much slower than that observed between nations.  This 
suggests the nominal exchange rate may facilitate adjustment toward PPP.  Instead of showing a 
facilitating role, our results indicate that the nominal exchange rate prolongs PPP disequilibrium 
adjustment. 
  As a caveat, this study does not explore possible nonlinearities in PPP convergence – an 
interesting area for further research.  While inviting alternative explanations for the PPP puzzle, 
Rogoff (1996) posits that trade costs (e.g., transport costs and tariffs) may be a contributing 
factor.  Because of goods-market frictions, there is a band within which nominal exchange rates 
can move without eliciting a quick response in relative prices.  With torpid price adjustment, real 
exchange rates converge very slowly inside the band.  The trade-costs view has gained popularity 
and prompted a number of studies on nonlinear PPP reversion (e.g., Michael et al., 1997; - 18 - 
Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997; O’Connell, 1998; Taylor et al., 2001; O’Connell and Wei, 2002).  The 
transaction-costs-cum-nonlinearity explanation is instructive and useful in highlighting the 
significance of goods-market impediments to price adjustment. 
  Engel and Morley (2001) have succinctly stated that the real puzzle is “why nominal 
exchange rates converge so slowly.”  As such, it is not clear how transaction costs, which should 
be relatively insignificant for foreign exchange markets, can account for the slow convergence of 
nominal exchange rates.  The recasting of the PPP puzzle poses a new challenge to theoretical 
models to explain the surprising behavior of nominal exchange rates.  Two anonymous referees 
further point out that there is actually more to the puzzle.  Why are the convergence rates of 
prices and nominal exchange rates different?  Can heterogeneous convergence speeds be 
consistent in general equilibrium?  Conventional models of PPP disequilibrium adjustment are 
based on saddle path analysis under rational expectations (à la Dornbusch’s (1976) sticky-price 
models).  Saddle path analysis typically prescribes that the endogenous (state and costate) 
variables – which are prices and nominal exchange rates in our case – will both converge to the 
steady state at the same rate.  The empirical evidence suggests this is not the case, however.  The 
differing speeds of convergence thus constitute a special puzzle that calls for new explanations. 
 - 19 - 
Footnotes 
1 Cheung and Lai (2000b) and Murray and Papell (2002) illustrate the existence of 
substantial sampling variability in measuring half-lives.  The present study is not concerned with 
the issue in measurement uncertainty.  Instead, it takes the findings of extremely slow 
convergence as empirical facts and investigates how the slow convergence in real exchange rates 
can occur. 
2 Engel and Morley (2001) envision a possible role of herding behavior, which might send 
nominal exchange rates temporarily off onto disequilibrium paths, thereby prolonging the 
convergence. 
3 When experimenting with the trivariate system, we also found that home and foreign 
prices have similar adjustment dynamics.  Modeling these prices separately did not produce any 
new useful results. 
4 The selected models appear adequately specified, given that there is little serial correlation 
present in the residuals.  In each case we also experimented with VEC specifications of different 
lag orders, k = 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.  The various lag specifications produced qualitatively similar 
results.  The results reported later in this paper were also found to be robust with respect to lag 
specifications. 
5 The central issue here concerns the different adjustment behavior of nominal exchange 
rates and prices, and we do not attempt to determine the structural sources of their innovations.  
Innovations to real exchange rates – real or monetary in nature – can operate through either 
nominal exchange rates or prices or both.  Monetary changes, for instance, can affect both 
nominal exchange rates and prices.  Hence, part of these innovations can come from similar 
sources, even though they work through different channels. 
6 In their study of many different real exchange rate appreciation episodes, Goldfajn and 
Valdes (1999) have found that most of the overvaluation cases are corrected through nominal 
exchange rate adjustment rather than price adjustment. 
7 This is also supported by our error variance estimates that the standard deviation of 
nominal exchange rate innovations are about 4 to 8 times higher than that of price innovations. 
 
8 Since the convergence of q (i.e., qt ÷ q ) is governed by a linear combination of e and p 
adjustments (i.e., et ÷ e and pt ÷ p ), where qt −q = (et − e ) + ( p − pt), the speed of real exchange - 20 - 
rate convergence should fall between the speed of nominal exchange rate convergence and that of 
price convergence.  The results in Table 4 bear out this expected pattern of differential speeds.  
Consistently, the HLq estimates are shorter than the HLe estimates but longer than the HLp 
estimates. - 21 - 
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